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Abstract
Significant changes and reforms have been initiated around the world and in a Malaysian context with
the aim of enhancing corporate governance and transparency. The nature of these regulatory reforms
clearly impacted on firm management's incentives to disclose information voluntarily. This study
empirically examines the influence of corporate governance structure on voluntary disclosure practices
of Malaysian listed firms from 1996 to 2001. This important timeframe encompasses the time period
before the Asian Financial Crisis and the aftermath of regulatory reforms such as the revamped KLSE
Listing Requirement released in 2001, widely recognized as a major milestone in Malaysian corporate
governance reform through the enhanced corporate disclosure. Our findings show that the extent of
voluntary communication is generally low, albeit showing an increase from 1996 to 2001. There is an
increase in the number of corporate governance characteristics adopted by firms, suggesting firms
exhibiting an improvement in the corporate governance structure. While corporate governance
structure is not a significant explanatory variable in 1996, our results suggest that a firm's corporate
governance structure has a significantly positive impact on voluntary disclosure in 2001. Large
companies voluntarily disclose more information in both years. The implications are that a greater
focus on corporate governance is resulting in an increase in transparency in the Malaysian setting.
Corporate change is generating better corporate communication.
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l.Introduction
Poor corporate governance and lack of transparency
of corporate financial reporting have frequently been
identified as some of the root causes of the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997 (Johnson et al. 2000; Rahman
1998). The crisis sent a clear message of the
importance of good corporate governance and
improved disclosure for individual corporations to tap
into international capital markets as well as for an
economy to achieve sustainable economic growth.
The need for a major improvement in transparency,
including both accounting and public disclosures,
becomes imperative (Greenspan 1998).
Communication via corporate disclosure is self-
evidently a very important aspect of corporate
governance in the sense that meaningñil and adequate
disclosure enhances good corporate governance. The
primary objectives of this paper are to examine the
level of voluntary disclosure and investigate the
determinants of Malaysian listed firms' pre and post
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Today's modern corporation is characterized by
the agency problem resulting from the separation of
management and shareholders. The managers have
incentives to take actions to increase their own utility,
but not to maximize the returns on capital invested by
the shareholders. This problem may manifest itself in
numerous ways, including direct wealth transfers
from the shareholders to the managers, sub-optimal
allocation of capital and managerial perquisite
consumption. As such, the need for effective
corporate governance mechanism in monitoring
manager's opportunistic behaviors becomes a matter
of necessity. Corporate governance is aptly defined as
an arrangement of a set of internal and external
mechanisms designed and adopted to ensure that self-
interested managers act to maximize the value of the
company to its shareholders (Denis & McConnell
2002; Shleifer & Vishny 1997).
A detailed and structured system of disclosure
enables investors to understand, and obtain accurate
and reliable information of companies in order to
make better investment decisions. Corporate
communication in the form of voluntary disclosure is
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an especially significant concern in a developing-
country with emerging markets, like Malaysia where
the development and sustainability of capital market
relies heavily on reducing the information gap
between management and investors. According to the
World Bank (2005), Malaysian capital market has
increased its importance and is striving diligently to
compete with the leading stock market locations in
this region. Thus, the study of voluntary disclosure
communication practices within the Malaysian setting
is important.
The contagious effects of the regional fmaneial
crisis, followed hy the plummeting of the stock
market, had seriously shaken the foundation of the
Malaysian economy. Significant changes and reforms
were initiated with the aim of enhancing transparency
and corporate governance. The nature of these
regulatory reforms clearly impacted on firm
management's incentives to disclose information
voluntarily.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, the development of regulatory environment in
Malaysia is discussed. Section 3 put forward the
theoretical position, relevant prior research and
hypothesis development. Section 4 outlines the data
set and methodology while section 5 presents the
fmdings of the study. Section 6 concludes the study
with final comments,
2.Developnient of regulatory framework
The crisis heightens the interests in effective
corporate governance system and voluntary disclosure
to enhance transparency in market forces. Prior to the
1997 financial crisis, the Malaysian regulatory regime
governing the corporate governance practices and
financial reporting was that of a supposed 'merit-
based' regulation system. Under this regulatory
regime, regulators decided on the propriety of firm
transactions which effectively lowered market
incentives for voluntary disclosure. Though Malaysia
was enjoying buoyant market condition, there were
low regulatory expectations governing disclosure
practices.
In 1996, the Malaysian Securities Commission
decided that a shift to 'disclosure-based' regulation
was a necessary progression for the Malaysian capital
market. However, the 1997 financial crisis brought to
the foreground the numerous deficiencies whose roots
lay in weak corporate governance practices, lack of
transparency, disclosure and accountability. As a
reaction to the crisis, the Ministry oT Finance
commissioned a high level of Finance Committee on
Corporate Governance in March 1998 to deal with the
weaknesses in the existing corporate governance
framework in Malaysia. The consultation process
resulted in the development of the Malaysian Code of
Corporate Governance. Around the same time, the
new financial reporting framework was developed,
which was represented by Financial Reporting
Foundation and Malaysian Accounting Standard
Boa'fd. Further, the Securities Commission initiated
the disclosure-based regulatory framework in which
market participants evaluate firm reporting practices.
The shift to full disclosure-based regulation
embedded with higher standards of disclosure, due
diligence and corporate governance took place in
2001. At the same time, the revamped KLSE Listing
Requirement released in 2001 was also widely
recognized as a major milestone in Malaysian
corporate governance reform through enhanced
corporate disclosure. The policy initiatives undertaken
demonstrate the increased emphasis placed on
disclosure and transparency. According to Millar et al.
(2005), Malaysia appears to now maintain similar
corporate governance standards consistent with
international best practice. The research question in
this paper is to what extent has the development of
this new regulatory framework had on the disclosure
of information voluntarily in the annual reports,
3.Theoretical position and hypothesis
development
The mainstream literature explains accounting policy
choice on the basis of agency theory. Directors and
nianagement have the choice of information
disclosure which is principally dependent on their
economic consideration, using agency theoretical
framework, Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulated
that separation of ownership and control of a firm
provides management with the incentive to serve their
personal interests at the expense of shareholder
interests, A major issue is the information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders. In this agency
relationship, management (agents) acquires
information about the present and likely fiiture
performance of the firm that is superior to that
acquired by shareholders (principals). Agents may
therefore take advantage of the unobservability of his
actions to engage in activities to enhance their
personal goals. Agents can use their discretion to
disclose or not disclose information depending on
how this impacts on the wealth of not only
themselves, but also all contracting parties to the firm
(Watts & Zimmerman 1990). Losses resulting from
such actions, and expenditures incurred to mitigate
them are referred to as agency costs. By providing
appropriate incentives for the agent, and incurring
expenditure in monitoring their action, the principals
can limit the extent of divergence from their interests.
Voluntary disclosure presents an excellent
opportunity to apply agency theory. Managers who
have better access to information can make credible
and reliable communication to the market to enhance
the value of the firm by reducing the costs of the
agency relationship. Extant literature (Denis &
McConnell 2002; Watts & Zimmerman 1990; Welker
1995) has utilized agency theory as a means to
explain managerial behavior in the areas of corporate
governance.
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In order to address agency problems arising from
interest divergence, shareholders can design
mechanisms to co-align managerial behavior with
owner preferences or monitor the actions of the
managers. The positivist agency theory describes how
governance mechanisiiis can be used to monitor the
agent's self-serving behavior. Corporate governance
refers to the arrangement of a set of internal and
external mechanisms designed and adopted to
ameliorate agency conflicts arising when ownership is
divorced from control and ensure that managers act in
the interests of shareholders. According to Johnson et
al. (1998), the implementation of effective corporate
governance mechanisms seems to offer a solution to
monitor and reduce managers' opportunistic behavior.
Disclosure facilitates the external monitoring of
corporate insiders and reduces the risk of being
expropriated by corporate insiders. Deciding on the
level of information disclosure allows management to
influence the level of uncertainty faced by investors in
making economic decisions. Firms with effective
processes, policies and systems in place in relation to
corporate governance are expected to disclose more
information of a discretionary nature (Ho & Wong
2001). Mitton (2002) suggests that disclosure is
typically considered as an integral part of corporate
governance in research. It is expected that firms with
corporate governance mechanism in place will be
likely to disclose more information in the annual
reports.
Drawing on the principles of the Malaysian
Code of Corporate Governance, increased corporate
communication is thought to be related to improved
corporate governance structure based on independent
oversight and strong internal checks and balances.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that the extent of
voluntary disclosure will be positively associated to
the corporate governance structure. To formally test
the influence of corporate governance structure on the
extent of voluntary disclosure, the following
hypothesis is examined:
HI: There is a positive association between
the corporate governance structure and the extent of
voluntary disclosure by Malaysian firms.
4.Data and methodology
Data are collected from the 1996 (representing pre-
1997 Asian financial crisis)^ and 2001 (representing
post-financial crisis) annual reports of 30 Malaysian
listed firms randomly selected from a population of
621 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly
known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). The
criteria of sample firms' selection are: (i) availability
of annual reports of companies for both periods, (ii)
companies selected in 1996 must remain listed on the
stock exchange in the other period; and (iii) all banks,
unit trust, insurance and finance companies are
excluded from the study due to different and stringent
regulatory requirements.
Sector representation of the sample firms, as
shown in Table 1, is based on the principal
classifications of Bursa Malaysia which include: (i)
trading/services sector and consumer products sector;
(ii) industrial products sector; (iii) construction and
property sectors, and (iv) plantation and mining
sectors.
Table 1. Sector representation of sample firms
Sector No. of firms Representation (%)
Trading/services and Consumer products sectors
Industrial product sector
Constmction and property sectors












The dependent variable is measured by a
voluntary disclosure index (VDI) which comprises a
comprehensive list of 84 diverse voluntary disclosure
items. The complete content of annual reports is
scrutinized against the disclosure checklist. These are
classified into the following major categories:
strategic and corporate information, financial and
capital market information, directors and senior
management information, future prospects, and social
and value-added information; these items are based on
the past literature such as Barako, Hancock & Izan
(2006) and Ghazali & Weetman (2006). A VDI score
was calculated for each firm for the 1996 and 2001
annual reports. An item scores 1 if disclosed and 0 if
it is not, subject to the applicability of the item
concerned. The VDI score for each company is
additive and unweighted (Cooke 1989a). A firm's
voluntary disclosure index (VDI) is defined as the
ratio of actual disclosures to the maximum possible
score. The VDI, calculated for each firm in each
period, is as follows:
^DIji = Actual disclosures for each firm
Maximum possible disclosure score
Where,
Iji = Voluntary Disclosure Index for firm
j year t. This index will be calculated separately
for each company in each of the two periods.
The disclosure decision is a complex and multi-
faceted one and it is appropriate to consider the
simultaneous effects of the independent and control
variables on the disclosure outcome (Labellc 2002).
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Aside from the VDl as a dependent variable and
corporate governance structure as independent
variable, this study also includes the standard control
variables of firm size and leverage in the statistical
analysis. To investigate the explanatory power of the
corporate governance structure, a multiple linear
regression model was constructed and performed.
VDI., =ß,+ ß.CGCSj, + ß.SIZE., + ß.LEV^, + s ¡,
where VDl j , = firm's voluntary disclosure scores
ß = estimated coefficient for each
item or category;
CGCSji = corporate govemanee composite
score for firm j in year t
OSCS ¡I = ownership structure composite
score for firm j in year t
= firm size for firm j in year t;
= leverage for firm j in year t;LEVj,
= error tenn
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) argue that a
direct measure of the governance is not only
necessary but also more effective. They set up an
indicator to measure the corporate governance
structure of a firm through merger and acquisition
criteria. Following Taylor et al. (2006) and Chen et al.
(2007), corporate governance characteristics are
combined into one index to proxy for the measure of a
firm's corporate governance structure. Based on the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Govemanee, twelve
corporate govemanee characteristics are derived to
construct a proxy composite measure of the corporate
govemanee structure of a firm. The composite
measure, corporate govemanee scores (CGS) is
created to capture the strength of a firm's corporate
governance structure, where a value of one or zero is
assigned to each of the corporate govemanee
characteristics as outlined in Table 2. All twelve
attributes are treated equally. A firm receives a CGS
score ranging from 0 to 12 depending on the number
of attributes satisfied. The CGS score, measured as a
percentage, was treated as a continuous variable in the
statistical analysis.














Arc the roles of the chairman Chief Executive Offiecr performed by different persons?
Do independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board
membership?
Does the board have defined poliey of management responsibilities of the board and
CEO?
Is audit committee chaired by independent non-exeeutivc dircetors?
Does audit eommittee eomprise at least three directors, majority of whom are
independent?
At least two members of audit eommittee have accounting or related financial
management expertise
Is remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive director?
Does remuneration committee consist wholly of non-cxceutive direetors?
Is structured remuneration poliey in plaee, where remuneration to direetors is eontingent
of performance?
Is there any disclosure of the details of remuneration to each direetor in the annual report?
Does nomination committee eonsist exelusively of non-exeeutivc direetors, majority of
whom are independent?
Does the eompany maintain sound system of internal eontrol - finaneial, operational,

























Y e s = l
No = 0
5. Results
Table 3 presents a summary of the firm's voluntary
disclosure scores. The extent of voluntary disclosure
for all sample firms is generally low, albeit shown an
increase from 28.7% in 1996 to 34.4% in 2001. The
extent of voluntary disclosure is relatively higher in
trading & consumer products industry, with a mean
VDI increased from 32.8% in 1996 to 40.0% in 2001.
Table 4 provides the data on voluntary disclosure of
infonnation as categorized into: (i) corporate &
strategic infonnation, (ii) financial and capital market
data, (iii) infonnation about directors and senior
management, (iv) future prospects information, and
(v) social reporting and value-added information.
There is a general increase in the extent of voluntary
disclosure of information in all categories. However,
over the two time periods, the extent of voluntary
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disclosure relating to directors and senior
management (66.6%), and social reporting and value-
added information (54.9%) are significantly greater
than the other categories.























































































































































































































































Table 4. Voluntary disclosure index per category
Category
Corporate & Strategie information
Finaneiai and capital market data
Direetors and senior management
Future prospects
































There is a general increase in the number of
corporate govemance characteristics adopted by the
firms over the two periods as shown in Table 5. This
is reflected in the increase in the tnean corporate
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governance score from 31.1% in 1996 to 53.3% in
2001, suggesting firms exhibiting an improvement in
the corporate governance structure. Table 5 also
reveals that greater changes have occurred with board
independence, board composition, role duality and
audit committee composition. However, firms tend to
be deficient in the remuneration committee
particularly the disclosure of details of remuneration
to each director (3.3%).














Arc the roles of the chairman Chief Executive Officer performed by different
persons?
Do independent non-cxccutivc directors comprise at least one-third of the board
membership?
Does the board have defined policy of management responsibilities of the board
and CEO?
Is audit committee chaired by independent non-cxccutivc directors?
Does audit committee comprise at least three directors, majority of whom arc
independent?
At least two members of audit committee have accounting or related financial
management expertise
Is remuneration eommittce chaired by independent non-exeeutive director?
Docs remuneration committee eonsist wholly of non-executive directors?
Is struetured remuneration poliey in plaee, where remuneration to directors is
contingent of perfonnanee?
Is there any disclosure of the details of remuneration to each direetor in the annual
report?
Does nomination committee eonsist exelusively of non-cxeeutlve direetors,
majority of whom are independent?
Does the eompany maintain sound system of internal eontrol - fmancial,
operational, eomplianee and risk management - to safeguard shareholders'




























Correlation coefficients between the two
independent variables, computed using Pearson's
product moment correlations, are presented in Table
6. Included in the same table is Spearman's Rho
which provides analysis of independent variables to
VDI. In 1996, Spearman's Rho indicates that no
significant association found between VDI and CGS
and the other two control variables. On the other
hand, significant associations between VDI and CGS
and total assets are found in 2001.
Table 6. Pearson correlations among continuous independent variables and Spearman's Rho









' Correlation is significant at the 1% level (two-tailed).






.435 (p = 0.016)
.514** (p = 0.004)
-.344 (NS)
* Correlation is significant at the 5% level (tvvo-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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•Significant at the 1% confidence level
**Significant at the 5% confidence level
The results of the multivariate test of the
hypothesis are documented in Table 7. The multiple
regression model for voluntary disclosure gives an
adjusted R^ figure of 26.1% in 1996. Corporate
governance structure of a firm is not significant at the
5% level and this does not support the positive
association predicted in the hypothesis. Firm size is
found to be significant (5 per cent level) and
positively associated with the extent of voluntary
disclosure as expected. This is contrary to the findings
by Haniffa & Cooke (2002) but consistent with that
found in Hossain, Tan & Adams (1994) for Malaysian
listed companies prior to the 1997 Asian financial
crisis. Consistent with these two studies, leverage is
not statistically significant.
A regression test was also performed using 2001
data. The multiple regression model is highly
significant (p < 0.001). The adjusted R ^ of 36.7% in
2001 has improved compared to that in 1996. The
coefficients representing corporate governance
structure and firm size are statistically significant (1
per cent level) and positively associated with the
voluntary disclosure. Again, there is no association
between leverage and the extent of voluntary
disclosure in 2001.
Conclusion
The paper has examined corporate governance
structure in influencing the extent of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports of companies listed on the
KLSE. The extent of voluntary disclosure is measured
in a cross-sectional manner for 1996 and 2001 using a
comprehensive voluntary disclosure index comprising
84 disclosure items. The study finds that there is an
increase in the extent of information voluntarily
disclosed by Malaysian listed firms over the two
periods. Corporate governance structure is measured
using a composite index consisting of 12
characteristics derived from the Malaysian Code of
Corporate Governance.
There is no association between the corporate
governance structure and the extent of voluntary
disclosure in 1996. However, there is a clear positive
association between corporate governance structure
and the extent of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian
listed firms in the 2001 financial year. The
enhancement of corporate governance structure as
well as the other regulatory reforms is statistically
significant in explaining voluntary disclosure in
annual reports. This implies that the effect of
regulations to enhance corporate transparency has a
strong parallel effect on Malaysian listed firms
towards more voluntary infonriation disclosure in
their annual reports.
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The control variable of firm size provides '
additional explanatory predictor of voluntary
disclosure. Firm size is the significantly positively
associated with the voluntary disclosure levels. Larger
firms possess the necessary resources for collecting
and presenting an extensive array of information. This
provides support for the agency theory that voluntary
disclosure systematically varies depending upon firm
size. On the other hand, leverage provides no
explanatory predictor of voluntary disclosure of
infonnation in firms' annual reports. This could be
due to the prevalent practice in Malaysia of including
restrictive covenants in debt agreements. Future
research should be undertaken to ascertain if
ownership structure of these firms is an additional
important determinant of the extent of voluntary
disclosure. Overall, the corporate reforms
implemented by Malaysia in 2001 appear to have
increased corporate governance structures and
resultant rise in disclosures. Transparency is
enhanced.
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